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Reductions among Number Theoretic Problems 
HEATHER WOLL* 
Department qf Computer Science, FR-35, Unioersir,, of Washington. 
Seattle, Washington 98195 
Many number theoretic problems such as integer factorization and the discrete 
logarithm problem have defied all attempts to classify their complexities. Thirteen 
such problems are considered, none of which is known either to have a deter- 
ministic polynomial time solution, or to be complete for any natural complexity 
class. Failing this, the next best goal is to determine which among these are the 
“easiest” and which are the “hardest” problems. Toward this end, this paper gives 
an overview of reductions among the problems. Two reductions are new: a deter- 
ministic polynomial time reduction from squarefreeness to Euler’s function d(n). 
and a probabilistic polynomial time reduction from order modulo a prime power to 
discrete logarithm modulo a prime power. ’ lYR7 Academic Prey. Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the recent interest in number theoretic complexity derives from 
its relation to the security of cryptosystems. In a survey on cryptosystems, 
Angluin and Lichtenstein (1983) present several cryptosystems whose 
security rests on the difficulty of solving problems for algebra, number 
theory, and cryptography (see Table I). 
Note added in proqf. Some recently proposed cryptosystems based on the INDEX problem 
are surveyed in Odlyzko, A. M.. “Discrete Logarithms in Finite Fields and Their Cryp- 
tographic Significance,” preprint. 
Consider the following problems: 
FACTORIZATION(n). Find the complete prime factorization of n. 
SQUAREFREENESS( Determine if there is a prime p such that 
p2 I n. 
PRIMALITY(n). Determine if n is prime or composite. 
FIND-PRIME(n). Find a prime number greater than n. 
d(n). Compute d(n) = lZ,T I, where Zz is the multiplicative 
* This material is based on work partially supported by National Science Foundation 
under Grants DCR-8301212 and DCR-8319218. Submitted in partial fultillment of the Master 
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TABLE I 
Cryptosystems Based on Number Theoretic Problems 
Cryptosystem Related problem 
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (1978) 
Goldwasser. Micah. and Yao (1981 ) 
Rabin (1979) 
Goldwasser and Micali (1981. 1982) 
Blum, Blum. and Shub (1982) 
Blum and Micali (1982) 
RSA-DECRYPTION 
SQUAREROOTS 
QUAD-RESIDUE 
INDEX 
group .(h / 1 d h d tz and gcd(h, n) = 1 ). Note that if the complete 
prime factorization of n is p;’ ... p;y, where the pi’s are distinct 
primes and the tx;‘s are positive integers, then d(n) = #(p;’ ... p;y) = 
P;’ I . . . Pm “~ll~‘((p,-l)...(p,,,-1)) (Hardy and Wright, 1979, 
Theorem 62 ). 
QUAD-RESIDUE(a, n). Determine if there is an .K such that 
x2 = u (mod tz). 
SQUAREROOTS(a, n). Compute .Y such that .Y’ = a (mod n), if such 
an s exists. 
RSA-DECRYPTION(a, n, k). Compute .Y such that .yk = a (mod n), 
where gcd(li, d(n)) = 1. 
ORDER(a, tz). Determine the order of a in ZT. Recall that the order of 
u divides &tz) evenly. 
INDEX(u, h, p’). Find the least nonnegative integer .Y that a-‘= b 
(mod p’), where p is an odd prime, i is a positive integer, and a is a 
generator of Z$. 
DISCRETE-LOG(a, b, n). Find any x such that a’ = b (mod n), if 
such an .y exists. 
GENERATOR(u, p’). Determine whether or not a is a generator of 
Z$, where p is an odd prime and i is a positive integer. Recall that the 
order of a generator is cj(p’). 
FIND-GENERATOR(p’). Output a generator of ZJ, where p is an 
odd prime and i is a positive integer. 
This paper concerns itself with deterministic and probabilistic 
polynomial time reductions among these 13 problems. The notions of 
reducibility used are clarified in Section 2. Figure 1 summarizes the reduc- 
tions presented in this paper. Finally, the known reductions are presented 
in Section 3, and a few new reductions are added in Section 4. (Similar 
reductions involving other number theoretic problems can be found in 
Bach, Miller, and Shallit, 1984.) 
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FIG. I. The reduction presented. 
2. REDUCIBILITIES 
Four types of deterministic and probabilistic reductions are used. If .4 is 
Cook-reducible to B, i.e., if there is an algorithm that can solve A in 
polynomial time given a polynomial time subroutine for B, then we write 
A <F B. In Fig. 1 this reduction is represented by a solid line from A to B. 
Suppose that, in addition to an oracle for B, the algorithm has access to a 
random number generator and the time constraint for the algorithm is 
relaxed to polynomial expected time. If the reduction is errorless we write 
A <E B and represent the reduction by a dotted line from A to B labelled 
with an “E.” When problem A has only two possible answers, i.e., “yes” or 
“no,” we will say the reduction has one-sided error if one of the answers is 
always correct and the other one is correct with probability 24. If the 
reduction has a one-sided error then we write A <r B and label the dotted 
line from A to B with a “1.” Finally, if the reduction from A to B results in 
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A returning a correct answer with probability at least $, i.e., with bounded 
error, then we write A 6: B and label the dotted line from A to B with “B.” 
Note that for the cases of one-sided error and bounded error, polynomial 
expected time is equivalent to polynomial worst-case time. 
The oracle has no responsibilities when the input is inappropriate. 
However, we will assume that on correct inputs the oracle will return an 
answer within some polynomial time bound. For example, suppose B is an 
oracle for the problem INDEX( g, a, pi). When p is not a prime or g is not 
a generator of Z;: 
1. A may return a syntactically incorrect answer; in which case we 
know that either p or g is inappropriate. 
2. A may fail to give an answer within a given polynomial time 
bound, and again we conclude that either p or g is inappropriate. (Here we 
assume that the time bound can be computed in polynomial time.) 
3. A may return a syntactically correct answer. The answer can be 
checked to see if it satisfies the appropriate equivalence, but we cannot con- 
clude that p is prime or g is a generator. 
Several of the problems considered require an integer n that is a perfect 
power. Notice that a binary search for integers m and k such that mk = n 
and 1~1 is the smallest root of n can be carried out in deterministic 
polynomial time. 
In Fig. 1 there are two horizontal lines dividing the problems into three 
groups. The problems at the top are each at least as hard as factorization 
(probabilistically), and therefore commonly believed to be intractable. (The 
best known algorithm for factorization is a probabilistic 20(Jlog ‘I log log “) 
time algorithm, Morrison and Brillhart, 1975; Dixon, 1981.) The problems 
at the bottom of the figure are known to be in random polynomial time 
since there is a polynomial time probabilistic algorithm for primality 
(Solovay and Strassen, 1978; Rabin, 1980). In fact, if one assumes the 
Extended Riemann Hypothesis, then primality can be determined in 
polynomial time without introducing probabilism (Miller, 1976). 
3. KNOWN REDUCTIONS 
3.1. Deterministic Reductions 
Most of the deterministic reductions in Fig. 1 are quite simple. Two of 
the reductions follow. 
PROPOSITION 1. ORDER(a, n) <F FACTORIZATION(n). 
Proof: Consider the following algorithm based on ideas from Long 
(1981): 
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1. Use the oracle to compute d(n) and its factorization 
(b(n) = qf1 . . . q$ 
2. order c 4(n) 
3. Foricl tosdo 
while (qi 1 order and aorderiyC 3 1 (mod n)) 
do order t order/q,. 
4. Return order. 1 
PROPOSITION 2. RSA-DECRYPTION(m, n, k) <; d(n). 
Prooj 1. Use the extended Euclid’s algorithm to compute s and t such 
that 
sk+ t(zqn)= 1. 
If no such s and t exist then return 0, since the algorithm has no respon- 
sibilities in this case. 
2. Return m’ mod n. 1 
3.2. Probabilistic Reductions 
The reductions in this section are probabilistic reductions. The 
correctness of these reductions rests on several facts: 
1. The Prime Number Theorem (Hardy and Wright, 1979, 
Theorem 6) implies that if a is chosen randomly and uniformly from Z,,, 
then the probability that a is a prime is l/Inn + o( l/In n). 
2. As a corollary to the Prime Number Theorem we see that 
4(n) > n/in n + o(n/ln n). In fact, d(n) = Q[n/ln In n] (Hardy and Wright, 
1979, Theorem 328 ). 
3. The number of generator elements in Zf is &&pi)) (Lipson, 1981, 
p. 863. One can show that d(d( pi)) = Q[p’/ln In p], therefore the 
probability that a randomly and uniformly chosen element bEZ,,, is a 
generator of Z$ is O[ l/in In p]. 
4. Suppose we have numbers 6, c E Z,f such that b’ = c2 (mod n) and 
b & kc (mod n). Then gcd(n, b + c) is a proper factor of n (see Knuth, 
1981, pp. 38c381). 
5. Suppose n has at least two distinct odd prime factors. Given a ran- 
domly and uniformly chosen aEZ,* and a positive integer .X such that 
a-‘= 1 (mod n), then with probability 2 4 we can find CE Z,* such that 
c2 = 1 (mod n) and c f &I (mod n) (see Bach, 1982; Miller, 1976, for more 
details). By fact 4, this is enough to factor n. It is interesting to note that if 
the Extended Riemann Hypothesis is true then there is such an a within the 
first O(log’ n) elements (Bach, 1983). 
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Three very similar algorithms will yield the reductions 
FACTORIZATION(n) <; ORDER(a, n), FACTORIZATION(n) -<; d(n), 
and FACTORIZATION(n) <E DISCRETE-LOG(a, 6, n). The following 
general algorithm, based on ideas from Long (1981), Finn (1982), and 
Bach (1983), will yield any of the three reductions when the appropriate 
oracle is used as specified, When the algorithm is used to reduce FAC- 
TORIZATION(n) to DISCRETE-LOG(a, b, 8) it errs when n is prime. 
However, it can be made errorless by an appeal to Tompa’s (1983) 
reduction. 
GENERAL ALGORITHM. 
1. If n is a perfect power, return one of its integral roots. 
2. If oracles for ORDER or 4(n) are available, then check for 
primality. Return n if it is prime. 
3. Choose u E Z,,\ (0) randomly and uniformly. 
4. Compute li t gcd(a, n). If k > 1 then it is a nontrivial factor of n, 
so return li. 
5. Compute the odd number u such that 
. 112' = ORDER(a, n), for some integer t. 
. ~2’ = d(n), for some integer 1. 
. zr2’= x, where a‘ = 1 (mod n). (The oracle for DISCRETE-LOG 
can be used to find such an x.) 
as appropriate. 
6. Compute OddPower + a” (mod n). 
7. Successively square OddPower until arriving at the first square 
root r of 1. 
8. If r = +l (mod n), then go to step 2. Otherwise, return 
gcd(r- I. n) as a nontrivial factor of n. 
It would be nice to have a reduction from DISCRETE-LOG to FAC- 
TORIZATION. Bach (1983) proves that, given oracles for both FAC- 
TORIZATION(n) and DISCRETE-LOG(a, b, p) for p prime, one can 
compute DISCRETE-LOG(a, b, n) for any integer n. Combining this result 
with the reduction DISCRETE-LOG(a, 6, pi) <p INDEX(a, b, pi) of 
Theorem 8, one gets a one-sided probabilistic polynomial time algorithm 
for DISCRETE-LOG(a, b, n), given oracles for both INDEX(a, b, pi) and 
FACTORIZATION(n). However there are no known reductions from 
lNDEX(u, h, p’) to any of the problems considered (besides DISCRETE- 
LOG 1. 
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There are also probabilistic reductions FACTORIZATION(n) 6 ,’ 
SQUAREROOTS(a, n) (see Rabin, 1979) and SQUAREROOTS(a, n) <E 
FACTORIZATION(n) (see Finn, 1982). The first reduction can be accom- 
plished by using the SQUAREROOTS oracle to find two integers with 
property 4 above. This results in a one-sided probabilistic algorithm, which 
can be made errorless by Tompa’s (1983) reduction. 
A key part of the SQUAREROOTS(a, n) <F FACTORIZATION(n) 
reduction is the computation of numbers a, ,..., a,, such that (a,)‘= a 
(mod p;) for all i, where n = ~7’ ... p,“,;‘. Such numbers can be computed by 
an errorless probabilistic algorithm (see Finn, 1982) if a is a quadratic 
residue. The Chinese remainder algorithm can then be used to compute the 
integer JJ such that .V = a, (mod ~71) for all i. 
The reductions FIND-GENERATOR( pi) <L GENERATOR(a, p’) and 
FIND-PRIME(n)<: PRIMALITY(n) are analogous in that rely on the 
density of primes (see fact 1) and the density of generators (see fact 3) 
respectively. They are errorless, since their oracles can ensure the 
correctness of any answer. 
4. NEW REDUCTIONS 
There is a straightforward reduction from SQUAREFREENESS to 
FACTORIZATION(n). Combining this reduction with the probabilistic 
reduction from FACTORIZATION(n) to 4(n) (see the general algorithm, 
Sect. 3.2) yields a probabilistic polynomial time reduction from 
SQUAREFREENESS to 4(n). The first reduction of this section, a 
deterministic polynomial time reduction from SQUAREFREENESS to 
d(n), is an improvement. 
The remaining reductions in this section are probabilistic reductions 
ORDER(u, p’) <; INDEX(u, h, p’), NONGENERATOR(u, h, p’) ~7 
INDEX(a, h, p’), and DISCRETE-LOG(u, h, p’) <p INDEX(u, h, p’). It is 
not known whether INDEX(u, h, pi) can be computed in polynomial time 
and Angluin (1982) suggests that, were there such an algorithm, it would 
be of little help with other problems. These new reductions suggest the 
contrary. 
4.1. Reducing SQUAREFREENESS to 4(n) 
THEOREM 3. SQUAREFREENESS <F b(n). 
The following simple recursive algorithm yields the desired reduction, 
SQUAREFREENESS <; d(n). 
Proof: Consider the following algorithm: 
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ALGORITHM. SQUAREFREENESS( boolean 
1. kc gcd(b(n), n). 
2. If k = 1 then return true. 
3. Otherwise, if gcd(k, n/k) # 1 then return false. 
4. Otherwise, return SQUAREFREENESS( 
The next two claims show that this algorithm reduces 
SQUAREFREENESS to d(n) and that the algorithm runs in 
polynomial time given that the oracle for 4(n) takes constant time. 
CLAIM. SQUAREFREENESS returns true if n is squarefree and 
,false otherwise. 
Prooj The claim is proved by induction on n. The claim holds for 
n = 2. Assume the claim holds for all k <n. 
SQUAREFREENESS returns true at step 2 if and only if 
k = gcd(&n), n) = 1. But k = 1 implies that II is squarefree. Therefore if 
SQUAREFREENESS returns true at step 2 then )I is squarefree. 
If SQUAREFREENESS returns false at step 3 then gcd(k, n/k) # 1. 
But if II were squarefree, then gcd(k, n/k) = 1 for any integer k, so n is not 
squarefree. 
Suppose SQUAREFREENESS returns SQUAREFREENESS in 
step 4. If n is squarefree, then clearly k is also squarefree. By the induction 
hypothesis we can assume that SQUAREFREENESS will return true 
and thus SQUAREFREENESS will return true. 
If n is not squarefree, then there is some prime p such that p2 1 n, and p 1 k. 
Since gcd(k, n/k) = 1 we know that p2 1 k and k is not squarefree. Therefore, 
by induction, SQUAREFREENESS and SQUAREFREENESS will 
both return ,fulse. 
CLAIM. Assuming the oracle calls on 4 take constant time, there is a 
constant c such that c log3(n) is an upperbound on the running time of 
SQUAREFREENESS( 
Proqf: Let c be constant such that k = gcd(&n), n), gcd(k, n/k), and n/k 
can all be computed in time d c log’(n) (see Angluin, 1982; Knuth, 1981), 
and let T(n) represent the running time of SQUAREFREENESS( 
The claim holds for tr = 2. Assume it holds for all k such that 2 d k <n. 
Steps (1) through (3) take timed c log’(n), and step (4) takes time T(k), 
so we have T(n) < c log2(n) + T(k). However k < n/2, so 
z-(n) < c log’(n) + C log+z/2) 
= c[log+r) + (log(n) - 1)3] 
d c log3(n). 1 
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It is interesting to note that this algorithm can be converted to test 
squarefreeness of polynomials by interpreting gcd as the polynomial gcd 
and replacing the oracle for 4 by an algorithm to compute the derivative of 
a polynomial. 
4.2. Probabilistic Reductions Involving Order, Index, and Generators 
A result relating the order of an element to the order of powers of the 
element provided motivation for a bounded error probabilistic reduction 
from ORDER(a, p’) to INDEX(a, b, p’) and one-sided error reductions 
from NONGENERATOR(a, pi) to INDEX(a, b, pi), and from DIS- 
CRETE-LOG(a, h, p’) to INDEX(a, b, p’). Let o(a) be the order of the 
element a in the group Z$. The key motivating result is the following 
lemma and a simple corollary whose proofs are left to the reader. 
LEMMA 4. Given an element aE Z,$, o(a’) = o(a)lgcd(j o(a)). 
COROLLARY 5. If‘ a is a generator of Zf, then o(a’) = pip ‘(p- l)/ 
gc4.L (P’-‘(P- 1))). 
THEOREM 6. ORDER(a, p’) <E INDEX(a, h, p’). 
ProqJ Consider the following algorithm. 
1. Determine integers p and i such that n = pi and p is the smallest 
integer such that n is a power of p (see the end of Sect. 2). (There is no 
need to check the primality of p since the algorithm is not responsible when 
the input is not of the correct form. However, it is possible to determine 
primality in random polynomial time.) 
2. Choose 20 In In p values giE Z; randomly and uniformly. 
3. For each g, E Z;, compute k, +- INDEX( gi, a, pi) and throw out all 
the answers that do not make any sense. (See the discussion in the beginn- 
ing of Sect. 2.) Check to see if g: 5 a (mod p’). 
4. If no gi is left, then return 0. 
5. For each remaining k, compute oicpi-‘(p- l)/gcd(k,, 
t/J-‘(P- 1))). 
6. Return min (o/j. 
Claim. The algorithm above provides a reduction from ORDER to 
INDEX. 
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Suppose some g, is a generator of Zf. By Corollary 5, we know that 
o(a) = o(gF) = oj. Notice that for all t such that gfl= a (mod p’) we have 
a”/ E ( gfr)“’ 
E [gy’-“” I)(k,/gcd(k,.lp’ ~‘lp- I II’] 
= 1 (mod p’), 
by Euler’s theorem. Thus min (oil 1 is the order of a and the algorithm 
returns the correct value at step 6. If we do not choose a generator, 
however, the algorithm might not answer correctly. 
Claim, The algorithm runs in expected time O(ln(ln(p))). 
Chebyshev showed that the number of primes less than n is > h(n/ln n) 
(LeVeque, 1977, p. 149). The probability of guessing a generator is 
#(d(p’))/p’. A lower bound on this probability is 
1 d(af)) > 1 
P’ 5 ln(ln(p))’ 
Thus the expected number of trials before the first success is 
~5 ln(ln(p)). Therefore the probability of finding a generator within 
20 ln(ln( p)) trials is >a. u 
The next reduction is of interest because the algorithm has only one- 
sided error rather than the bounded error of the previous reduction. The 
trade-off is that the problem being solved is simpler. 
THEOREM 7. NONGENERATOR( a, p’) < f INDEX(a. h, p’). 
Proqf The algorithm of Theorem 6 can be modified to give an 
algorithm for determining NONGENERATOR(a, p’): 
I. Determine integers p and i such that N = p’ and p is the smallest 
integer such that )I is a power of p (see the end of Sect. 2). (There is no 
need to check the primality of p since the algorithm is not responsible when 
the input is not of the correct form.) 
2. Choose 20 ln(ln( p)) values g, E Z$ randomly and uniformly. 
3. For each g, E Z$, compute k, t INDEX( g,, a, p’) and throw out all 
the answers that do not make any sense. (See the discussion in the beginn- 
ing of Sect. 2.) Check to see if gF/ = a (mod p’). 
4. If no gj is left, then output possibly a generator. 
5. For each remaining lij compute m, +- gcd(k,, p’-- ‘(p - 1)). 
6. If any mi# I, then return nongenerator, otherwise return possibly u 
generator. 
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Claim. The algorithm reduces NONGENERATOR to INDEX with 
one-sided error. 
Note that if a is a generator and g:f =a (mod p), then g, must 
also be a generator, o(grl)=piP’(p- I), and o(g,)=p’+‘(p- 1). 
But by Corollary5, o(gF)=p’-‘(p-l)/gcd(k,,(p’+‘(p-I))), so 
gcd(k,, pi-- ‘(p - 1)) = 1. Therefore mi= 1 for all j considered, and the 
algorithm will reject a as possibl)! a generator. 
If a is not a generator then o(a) < p’+ ‘(p- 1). If one of the gls is a 
generator (which occurs with probability b i) then gcd(k,, pi ‘(p - 1)) # 1 
and a is accepted as a nongenerator. 1 
The final result reduces the discrete logarithm modulo a prime power to 
the seemingly more restrictive index problem. 
THEOREM 8. DISCRETE-LOG(a, h, pi) <p INDEX(a, h, p’). 
Proqf. The following lemma motivates the algorithm and its proof of 
correctness. The proof of the lemma is straightforward. 
LEMMA 9. Zf g is a generator sf Z,$, a E g” (mod p’), and b E g/ 
(mod p’), then the following statements are equivalent: 
1. There exists an integer x such that a’ E b (mod pi). 
2. There exists an integer s such that kx = j (mod pip ‘(p - 1 )). 
3. gcd(k,p’ ‘(p-1))lj. 
ALGORITHM. 
1. Determine integers p and i such that n = pi and p is the smallest 
integer such that n is a power of p (see the end of Sect. 2). (There is no 
need to check the primality of p since the algorithm is not responsible when 
the input is not of the correct form.) 
2. Choose g E Z$ randomly and uniformly. 
3. Run the algorithm of Theorem 7 to determine if g is a generator. If a 
is accepted as a nongenerator, then go to step 2. 
4. Compute k +- INDEX( g, a, p’) and j t INDEX( g, b, p’). Check the 
answers as in the previous two algorithms and if they are not consistent 
then go to step 2. 
5. Use the extended Euclid’s algorithm to compute integers gcd(k, 
pi~‘(p-1)),s,andtsuchthatsk+tp’~’(p-1)=gcd(k,p’~‘(p-1)). 
6. If gcd(k, p’+ ‘(p - 1)) l j, then return discrete log probably does not 
exist. 
7. Return (j/gcd(k, pi- ‘(p - 1))) s. 
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Claim. The algorithm reduces DISCRETE-LOG to INDEX with 
bounded-error probability. 
If discrete log probably does not exist is returned by the algorithm in 
step 6, then by Lemma 9 we know that g is not a generator or there is no 
integer s such that aY = b (mod pi). However, g is a generator with 
probability >i at this point, so the probability that there is no x such that 
a’=b (mod p’) is >i. 
If an integer value x is returned in step 7, then 
-g 
(//gcd(P.p’-‘lp- I)))(sk+rp’-‘(p-1)) 
zz 
-g’ 
z b(mod p). 
Note that the algorithm runs in polynomial expected time since the 
probability that g is a generator is Q[ l/in In p] (see fact 3, Sect. 3.2). 1 
The reductions in this section were based on the ability to find a 
generator g with high probability. The oracle INDEX is employed to 
increase the probability of finding a generator. If one could get an errorless 
reduction FIND-GENERATOR(a, p’) <E INDEX(a, b, p’), then errorless 
reductions GENERATOR(a, pi) <L INDEX(a, b, p’), ORDER(a, pi) <E 
INDEX(a, b, p’), and DISCRETE-LOG(a, b, pi) <L INDEX(a, 6, pi) would 
follow immediately. This motivates the question: “Where do the algorithms 
err?” It turns out that the algorithms will only make mistakes if in step 3 
(Theorem 6 or 7) o( gi) = o(a) for all consistent g,‘s, but unfortunately it is 
unclear what to do from here. 
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